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Abstract
Over the last decade, several countries around the world developed a collective sense of
doom and gloom: Their Zeitgeist could be characterized as one of decline. Paradoxically, in
some countries, such as the Netherlands, this collective discontent with society seems to
exist despite high levels of individual well-being. Current psychological research informs us
about why individuals would feel unduly optimistic, but does not account for a collective
sense of decline. The present research develops a novel operationalization of Zeitgeist,
referred to as a general factor Z. We conceptualize Zeitgeist as a collective global-level
evaluation of the state (and future) of society. Three studies confirm that perceptions of the
same societal problems at the personal and collective level differed strongly. Across these
studies we found support for a hypothesized latent factor Z, underlying collective-level per-
ceptions of society. This Z-factor predicted people’s interpretation of new information about
society that was presented through news stories. These results provide a first step in opera-
tionalizing and (ultimately) understanding the concept of Zeitgeist: collectively shared ideas
about society. Implications for policy are discussed.
Introduction
Notwithstanding high levels of individual well-being, in several Western countries the general
outlook on the state of society is decidedly pessimistic. People indicate that they are troubled
by several discontents with the collective welfare in society: there are nation-wide problems
with poor security, a lack of social cohesion, bad economic prospects, and so forth. However,
judgments made at this collective level can be markedly different and independent from per-
sonal level judgments: the majority of individuals who believe that we are unhappy can, at the
same time, claim that I am happy. Thus, the aggregate of personal perceptions may bear little
resemblance to collective perceptions. The present research seeks to develop a better operatio-
nalization of such collective societal discontents.
We hypothesize that judgments about specific societal issues (e.g., safety, education, immi-
gration) are guided by a more global affective evaluation of the state of society. These global
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affective evaluations are abstract, collective level judgments (i.e., a sense that “we” are doing
well or are doing badly). These global affective evaluations, we suggest, are strongly guided by
the perceived social consensus. In this way, a climate of (dis)content can emerge, an aspect of
what is sometimes referred to in popular terms as Zeitgeist. The purpose of the present research
was to attempt to develop an operationalization of this Zeitgeist. The utility of such an instru-
ment is that, in future, it would allow us to gain a better understanding of collective societal dis-
contents. The paper proposes and tests two related measures of Zeitgeist, operationalized as a
latent factor Z. The research shows that Z can predict several outcomes, including what news
stories people are inclined to believe and what inferences they draw from particular incidents
about society and people in general.
Societal Discontents
For the past decade or more, many Western societies have experienced a sense of doom and
gloom. The situation in the Netherlands provides an extreme example: approximately since
2001, public intellectuals, commentators and politicians have presented the country as “rotten
to the core”: In public debate and the media, the image portrayed has been one of a deeply
divided country suffering endemic problems with the welfare state, state services, and democ-
racy itself [1,2]. Indeed, approximately three-quarters of Dutch citizens appear to be convinced
that “society” is moving in the wrong direction [1,2]. The same phenomenon, although less
extreme, can be witnessed in many other Western societies. In 2013, 65% of US citizens and
68% of UK citizens were dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country; figures that
have been relatively stable since 2007 [3]. In Australia, pessimism about society is a more recent
phenomenon: since 2010 trust in the federal government fell sharply and a sense of pessimism
about the future has increased [4]. Apparently, across various countries a consensus has
emerged that society is doing badly.
This phenomenon is particularly puzzling when contrasted to statistics that suggest that pri-
vate well-being is high. In case of the Netherlands, 82% of Dutch people state that they are
happy with their personal life [1]. And 67% of US and 65% of UK citizens describe their per-
sonal economic situation as good [3]. In Australia between 2010 and 2014, 87–89% of people
indicated being happy in their personal life [4]. Thus, while a large majority of individuals is of
the opinion that society is in decline, at the same time there is a large majority of individuals
who report to be happy with their personal life. How can such deeply felt societal discontents
be reconciled with a happy citizenship and (relatively) good living-conditions, within the same
societies and (to some extent) within the same individuals?
In understanding this phenomenon, it is important to note that the sense of gloom focuses
on the abstract collective level (society, the country, the people, “us”) whereas the sense of well-
being focuses on more concrete personal outcomes (my personal circumstances, my life, “I”).
These different levels of abstraction, we suggest, are linked to distinct social realities. Through
(inter)national surveys, we can construct relatively well how people view their personal lives,
based on the information about themselves which they are willing to share with interviewers or
survey agencies. International organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) provide information on various indicators of personal-level
well-being, which is then aggregated to infer OECD countries’ (economic) state. But we argue
that the collective level of well-being is only partially captured by aggregating personal-level
statistics: personal well-being can be quite independent of discontents with society as a whole.
This is because collective-level discontents express dissatisfaction about us, about our society:
Collective discontents (with education, immigration, individualism, the welfare state, etc.) are
about the perceived collective problems that the group as a whole is supposed to suffer from.
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These discontents may be completely independent of people’s personal problems or the well-
being of individuals.
Judgments about others and judgments about society
How can we start to conceptualize collective societal discontents? One literature that is impor-
tant here focuses on why people on average tend to be more positive about themselves in com-
parison to others. Such social comparative judgments are studied extensively in social
psychology, as for example the Better-than-Average and comparative optimism effects (see e.g.
[5–8]). This research has specifically focused on explaining why people on average perceive
themselves to be better than others on a range of personal characteristics (e.g. better drivers [9]
or more polite than others [10]) and less at risk of a negative life event happening to them [11].
This discrepancy between judgments about the self and others is explained by motivated as
well as non-motivated processes (for reviews see e.g. [5,7]). Motivated explanations focus on
desires for self-enhancement: people have unreasonably rosy views of their personal life [6].
Non-motivated explanations have mainly focused on cognitive biases caused by the fact that
people often have more information about themselves than they do about others or see the self
as more central in the jugdment process [7].
The most common method used to investigate the effects in this literature is through direct
comparison. Participants are asked to judge: how sociable am I, compared to the average stu-
dent [7]. This method has been developed because the indirect method, asking seperately how
sociable I am and how sociable I think the average student is, has several disadvantages. The
direct method is important because it allows researchers to optimally answer the dominant
question in this field: why are personal judgments relatively rosy? Could this be because of
motivational factors (self-enhancement), because of cognitive biases, or both?
As a result of methodological choices as well as of these guiding questions, the field has
focused less on the question how judgments about others are made. The underlying assump-
tion tends to be that we have less knowledge about others than about ourselves [12]. But whilst
it is true that people tend to know less about concrete others than they do about themselves, it
is also true that in many cases people believe they can form very good judgments of others in a
more global sense. The prime example is when people judge members of an outgroup: here,
socially shared stereotypes are likely to inform judgments in a systematic fashion [13]. In this
sense, judgments about a collective object or generalized other can differ starkly from judg-
ments of concrete others. Therefore we suggest that judgments at this collective level are quali-
tatively different from personal-level judgments about the self or about concrete others. A
discrepancy between these levels of judgments is thus intriguing but not necessarily informa-
tive for understanding why or how people judge collective-level objects: both levels of judg-
ments are influenced by distinct types of information. So to understand the pervasive
gloominess about the state of society apparent in various countries, we propose it is important
to study people’s collective judgments about issues or characteristics of their society, indepen-
dently of the parallel personal judgments they might make.
Prior research into collective-level judgments
If we want to study collective judgments or perceptions it is important to know how to opera-
tionalize them. From the literature, we were unable to distill a consensus about the best opera-
tionalization of collective-level judgments or perceptions. In much research,
operationalizations of collective-level judgments simply aggregate personal-level judgments in
a variety of different ways. For example, sociological research on the transmission of values
between parents and their children has attempted to operationalize Zeitgeist [14,15]. In this
Collective Discontents and Zeitgeist
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research Zeitgeist was operationalized as the most frequently existing (i.e. modal) individual
value in the population. Similarly, in communication research investigating public opinion cli-
mate from the perspective of the Spiral of Silence theory [16], public opinion polls of people’s
personal judgments are described as the straightforward way to make inferences about the pub-
lic opinion climate [17]. In both cases a general collective concept (Zeitgeist or public opinion
climate) is inferred from personal-level judgments.
But as reviewed above, the psychological literature already shows that personal and aggre-
gate-level judgments tend to be very different. Accordingly, we argue that it would be errone-
ous to make inferences about, for example, the (perceived) safety of society from aggregate
personal judgments of safety. The perception of society as unsafe is likely to be determined by
very different factors than personal safety perceptions. Indeed, research on risk perceptions has
shown that societal-level and personal-level risk judgments are distinct types of judgments
with different psychological antecedents (e.g., [18,19]). For example in research on climate
change risk perceptions, Van der Linden [19] showed that knowledge about the causes and
consequences of climate change and response-behavior reducing climate change uniquely pre-
dicted societal-level but not personal-level risk perceptions. In contrast, personal experience
with extreme weather events predicted personal-level, but not societal-level risk perceptions.
Recent studies of cross-national and cross-cultural comparisons have also distinguished
more systematically between levels of judgment of the kind which we explore in the current
research. This research shows that perceived collective-level characteristics in a nation or cul-
ture can be independent from personal-level prevalence of these characteristics or values.
Research on personality and stereotypes of national character, for example, showed that collec-
tive-level perceptions of national personality characteristics are largely unrelated to aggregated
personal characteristics [20,21]. More interestingly, personality and national stereotypes both
predict behaviors, albeit different kinds [22].
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the cross-cultural literature. Chiu and colleagues
[23] have attempted to measure collective-level perceptions of cultural values, which they refer
to as intersubjective judgments. Intersubjective perceptions are conceptualized as shared per-
ceptions: respondents are asked to what extent a representative member of the group would
endorse certain values (intersubjective judgment) and this is contrasted to respondents’ per-
sonal endorsement. Studies of intersubjective values found that they are quite distinct from
individual-level values (e.g., [24–27]). For example, American participants perceived other
Americans to be more individualistic (vs. collectivistic) and Polish participants perceived other
Poles to be more collectivistic (vs. individualistic), while actual (personal) levels of endorse-
ment of these values did not differ between American and Polish participants [27].
In sum, both cross-national and cross-cultural research confirms the possibility of meaning-
fully operationalizing judgments at the collective level. The present research applies these
insights not to national stereotypes or cultural values, but rather to judgments about society as
a whole. Specifically, we will distinguish personal-level and collective-level judgments about
important public issues that could affect respondents’ life directly, but that could also charac-
terize the state of society as a whole.
Operationalizing Zeitgeist
The common perceptions of the problems that exist in many Western countries are not just
very negative, they also seem to generalize across a very broad range of outcomes: the sense of
decline extends to society as a whole, not just one concrete part of it. How can one account for
the relatively abrupt emergence of such a broad spectrum of societal discontents within a broad
segment of society? Societal discontents (as well as societal satisfactions) appear to flourish in a
Collective Discontents and Zeitgeist
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particular societal climate or Zeitgeist: a pervasive, consensual perception of society. Society as
a whole appears to be rotten, and this taints every concrete judgment about society. How can
this be operationalized from a social psychological perspective?
In the present research, we propose that specific societal discontents (e.g., with education,
crime, etc.) stem from a global feeling of discontent with society—something which one could
term negative Zeitgeist. Our reasoning is that this negative Zeitgeist functions as some form of
collective prejudice against one’s own society: a shared preconceived opinion that things in
society are bad (or good, as the case may be). We propose that this Zeitgeist colors particular
societal (dis)contents; since these (collective) judgments are not necessarily based on concrete
facts or actual personal experiences. In other words, when the Zeitgeist concerning the state of
society is very negative, this taints judgments of particular societal issues ranging from, say,
crime levels to satisfaction with service levels. Thus, Zeitgeist should affect collective percep-
tions of any component of society. Abstract societal topics should be especially strongly
affected by the Zeitgeist, since for these topics (for example “individualism”) other more con-
crete sources of information on society’s state are less readily available [28].
Putting both these elements together, one could operationalize Zeitgeist as a general factor
(or “Z”) that predicts a range of distinct collective judgments (cf. the top half of Fig 1). Statisti-
cally, this approach can be compared with the g-factor in intelligence research where G is an
underlying “general intelligence” factor that predicts performance on particular IQ tests [29].
In our approach, Z is an underlying “general (dis)content” factor that predicts particular socie-
tal discontents and satisfactions.
Furthermore, since we are interested in the influence of Zeitgeist on perceptions of society
as a whole, one needs to ask individuals about their perceptions of collective societal discon-
tents and satisfactions. Following the literature on social comparative judgments reviewed
Fig 1. Conceptual model of Zeitgeist.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130100.g001
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above, we argue that the state of society can be inferred if one asks questions about the condi-
tions faced by the average or modal citizen (i.e. the “generalized” other). Such perceptions of
the challenges faced by us, collectively (e.g., the average person in my society feels unsafe), can
be markedly different from one’s personal-level experiences (e.g., I feel unsafe).
In the present research, we therefore contrast collective judgments with personal judgments
of societal issues (e.g., “crime is a problem in the life of the average citizen” vs. “crime is a prob-
lem in my life”). Since personal judgments are influenced by concrete personal experiences and
(direct) social comparisons in the many different areas of everyday life, we expect that per-
sonal-level judgments of various societal issues would have strong interrelations when issues
concern the same area of life, but lower interrelations when issues concern different areas of
life (and therefore, for a range of topics as a whole, see Fig 1’s bottom half). This contrasts with
collective societal judgments, which we assume to be more strongly influenced by the Zeitgeist.
Overview of the Present Research
In this paper, we develop and test a new method to measure Zeitgeist regarding the state of
society. Specifically, we designed two complementary measures of personal and collective per-
ceptions of the same societal issues. These two measures were tested in three studies, across
two different societal contexts: the Netherlands (Study 1 and 2) and the United States (Study
3).
The first measure was created to assess the perceived prevalence of relatively concrete per-
sonal and collective experiences on a scale that would allow us to make direct comparisons
between personal and collective perceptions: Participants were asked to estimate how many
out of the last 30 days they (personal level) or the average person in their country (collective
level) encountered specific societal problems (e.g. crime, the recession). We reasoned that this
method of measuring the prevalence of problems would echo the personal level questions
asked in (inter)national surveys (e.g., Eurobarometer, World Value Survey) to gather informa-
tion on the prevalence of societal problems. In addition, it would offer a framework within
which one could make “direct” comparisons between the personal and collective perceptions:
While my personal problems with crime in my neighborhood are relatively rare, most other
people have (or the average person has) these problems more frequently. This measure is used
in Study 1 and 3.
A limitation of this type of measure, however, is that it is less suitable to measure abstract
concerns that people might have (e.g., with individualism). We therefore developed a measure
using a more conventional format in social psychological research: statements on a 7-point
Likert scale. These evaluative statements concerned abstract concepts and issues that are
important for a well-functioning society (e.g. corruption, inequality). They resembled state-
ments about the state of society which are frequently encountered in daily life, as voiced by pol-
iticians or through the media: for example, “Corruption is a problem in our society”. These
collective-level statements were contrasted with personal-level statements about the same
issues, but more concretely formulated (e.g., Many people I know act corruptly). This measure
is tested in Study 2 and 3.
We used these measures to address three central questions. First, we investigate aggregated
personal- and collective-level perceptions (Study 1–3). Based on the presumed prevalence of a
negative Zeitgeist in both the Netherlands and the US, we expect these perceptions to differ to
the extent that people will be more negative about collective life than about their personal life.
Finding these differences would not only highlight the presence of this negative Zeitgeist, but
also show that aggregated personal and collective perceptions of the same social issues are qual-
itatively different.
Collective Discontents and Zeitgeist
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Second, we explore the factor structures of personal and collective perceptions (Study 1–3).
We expect to find evidence for a latent general factor Z that underlies collective-level percep-
tions of society, in line with our conceptualization of Zeitgeist. For personal-level perceptions
we predict that these will show less general coherence and form clusters according to various
areas of personal life (e.g., safety, economy). But we have no specific predictions for the number
of factors at this personal level (not least because our measures constitute a broad range of
issues: we did not anticipate any specific factor structure a priori). By contrast, at the collective
level we expect to find one single factor or dimension that explains substantial variance in par-
ticular judgments. This would be consistent with the idea that there is a coherent Zeitgeist at
the heart of negativity about issues as diverse as crime, immigration, individualism, lack of
respect, etc.
Third, we investigate the predictive validity of Z (Study 2 and 3). We expect that collective
self-prejudices would influence how people interpret and attribute new information they
receive about their society: Any “news” about the state of society should, to some extent, be col-
ored by such prejudices. This is examined by having participants indicate whether they think
several pessimistic news headlines could be true (Study 2 and 3), and to examine how responsi-
bility for negative events is attributed to society (Study 2).
Study 1
Method
Participants and procedure. Fifty male and 126 female Dutch university students (Mage =
21.13; age range: 17–50 years) were approached in canteens or after participation in another
study to fill in a short paper-and-pencil questionnaire. During informed consent they were
informed that the research explored experiences of people who live in the Netherlands.
Ethics statement. This research was approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology of
the University of Groningen. Study 1, written informed consent was obtained. In accordance
with local ethical standards, people aged 16 and over are considered capable to decide whether
or not to participate in research, so local ethical guidelines do not require consent by parents or
guardians. In Study 2 and 3, which were conducted as online surveys, written informed consent
was obtained (and included a statement which stated that by starting the questionnaire respon-
dents agreed to participate, as is in line with local standards).
Prevalence estimates. Participants estimated the prevalence of societal problems in the
past 30 days on two different dimensions: for themselves (personal) vs. for the average Dutch
person (collective). The 12 problems were: Criminality; Alcohol abuse; Immigrants; Loitering
teens; The recession; Personal enrichment or fraud; The government; The police; Foreigners;
Money shortage; Offensive behavior by people they know; and Offensive behavior by strangers.
We selected these specific problems because they reflected societal problems that at the time
were discussed in politics and media in the Netherlands.
First, we instructed participants to think about their personal lives: “think for example
about the conversations you have, the things you do, and the people and situations you
encounter in your daily life”. Subsequently, they estimated the number of days they encoun-
tered the 12 problems (ranging from 0 to 30) for the past 30 days in their personal lives (per-
sonal dimension; α = .74). Next, participants were instructed to think about the average Dutch
person: “What does the life of a Dutch person look like during 30 days? Think about the con-
versations Dutch people have, the things they do, and the people and situations they encoun-
ter.” Following this introduction, participants estimated the number of days that the average
Dutch person encountered the 12 problems during the last 30 days (collective dimension; α =
.92). This prevalence estimates measure is reported in full in S1 Appendix. In addition, age and
Collective Discontents and Zeitgeist
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sex were assessed. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for participating in this
research.
Additional methodological detail. We originally attempted to manipulate participants’
perceptions of the possible (future) state of Dutch society (positive vs. negative vs. both positive
and negative). On a separate page before the prevalence estimates measures, participants read a
short text that framed the state of the country as either an upward trend (positive), a downward
trend (negative), or not a clear trend (both positive and negative) since the 1980s, e.g. “The fol-
lowing questions concern the situation in the Netherlands. We are interested in this topic
because Dutch people have lived in adversity for the past few years [vs. prosperity for the past
few years vs. have lived in prosperity for too long].”However the manipulation check was non-
significant and no systematic effects of the manipulation on the DV’s approached significance;
we concluded that the manipulations were ineffective and these will not be discussed further.
Furthermore, in addition to judgments about the past 30 days, we also asked participants to
estimate the prevalence of societal problems during a period of 30 days some years in the future
(in the month of their graduation). These future judgments were largely the same as those for
the present. Because they add so little insight into the process, future judgments are ignored in
this paper.
Before the prevalence estimates measure, we exploratively included potential predictors of
Z: belief in a just treatment (14 items, adapted from [30]), satisfaction with life (5 items,
adapted from [31]), and optimism (10 items, adapted from [32]). Because the emphasis in this
paper is on the factor structure, these variables are not taken into account here. Correlations
between these variables and collective- and personal-level prevalence estimates are presented
in Table A in S1 Supplementary Materials, for interested readers.
Results
Analytic strategy. Upon data screening, two participants were excluded from analyses for
not completing the questionnaire. Furthermore, multivariate outlier analysis with Mahalanobis
distance (see e.g. [33]) identified eight multivariate outliers (participants with inconsistent pat-
terns of scores on items constituting key variables, e.g., scoring 7 on both normal and reversed-
scored items) which were excluded from further analyses. All subsequent analyses were based
on N = 166 participants. First, mean differences were explored. Second, exploratory factor anal-
yses (EFAs) examined how many factors could be extracted on the basis of conventional crite-
ria in EFA (i.e., parallel analysis [34] in R 3.0.2 with the nFactors package and (theoretical)
coherence of the extracted factors). We chose EFA rather than confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) because we did not have a priori predictions for a specific factor structure of personal-
level prevalence estimates.
Inspection of differences in means. We examined differences in mean prevalence esti-
mates between personal and collective judgments using repeated measures analyses of variance
[ANOVA]. This ANOVA showed a strong significant main effect of the personal-collective
dimension, F(1,165) = 261.47, p< .001, ηp
2 = .62. While participants on average estimated to
have encountered the societal problems in their life on 1.98 days (95% CI [1.62, 2.33]), they
estimated the average Dutch person to have encountered these problems on 6.45 days (95% CI
[5.78, 7.12]). Thus as expected, people were more negative about collective life than about their
personal lives.
Exploratory factor analyses [EFAs]. We conducted EFAs to explore whether estimates of
societal problems would cluster into one (collective level) or multiple (personal level) factors.
Principal Axis Factoring with oblique Promax rotation (assuming that factors could be corre-
lated, [35]) was performed with IBM SPSS Statistics 20 on the prevalence estimates per
Collective Discontents and Zeitgeist
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dimension (personal vs. collective). Initial screening indicated that the items referring to prob-
lems with the recession and money shortage were very highly correlated, pointing to redun-
dancy issues. We therefore chose to exclude the item “Money shortage” from the EFAs,
thereby enhancing interpretation of the factor solutions. Thus, two EFAs were performed on
11 problem-items per dimension. For the purpose of the research question and limitations of
space, it is sufficient to summarize the key findings.
For personal estimates, the best fitting factor solution extracted four factors (see Table 1;
Note that parallel analysis was not entirely conclusive on whether the best fitting factor struc-
ture had four or three factors. We choose to report the four-factor solution because of relatively
better interpretability of the extracted factors). Eigenvalues of these factors were 3.33, 1.51,
1.35, and 1.15 and the total explained variance was 66.79%. Factor loadings ranged between .41
and .97. However, several communality coefficients (i.e., the percentage of variance in a given
variable explained by all the factors together) were below .40 and therefore considered poor
(see e.g., [36]). In sum, the personal-level four-factor solutions had a reasonably good fit to the
data.
In contrast, for collective judgments a single factor was extracted. This single factor had an
eigenvalue of 6.27 and explained 56.97% of the variance (see Table 1). The factor loadings were
good to excellent, ranging between .59 and .84. Most communality coefficients were sufficiently
high as well; only the item “fraud” had a communality value below .40. Thus, for the collective-
level dimension, the single-factor solution seemed to be a good fit to the data. In line with our
expectations, the EFAs suggested that multiple factors underlie estimates of the prevalence of
societal problems at the personal level, while one factor underlies estimates of the same societal
problems at the collective level (for the average Dutch person).
Variance explained by Z. In order to examine the hypothesis that collective-level judg-
ments would be accounted for by a single underlying dimension of Z, we examined the
Table 1. EFA Pattern and Structure Coefficients of Prevalence Estimates (Promax; Study 1).
Personal Collective
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 h2 Factor 1 h2
Foreigners .72 (.70) (.25) (.28) .49 .80 .65
Immigrants .70 (.57) .37 .84 .70
Loitering Teens .53 (.64) (.31) (.46) (.27) .45 .79 .63
The police .41 (.56) (.35) (.34) (.40) .38 .78 .61
The recession .75 (.67) .49 .64 .41
The government (.39) .71 (.74) .56 .68 .47
Fraud .56 (.58) (.37) .40 .59 .35
Criminality (.44) (.29) .97 (.98) .96 .77 .59
Alcohol abuse .48 (.44) .24 .66 .43
Indecency–known (.31) (.31) .97 (.95) .92 .72 .52
Indecency–strangers (.41) (.30) .49 (.56) .39 .69 .48
Eigenvalue 3.33 1.51 1.35 1.15 6.27
Percentage of variance 30.31 13.69 12.30 10.48 56.97
Correlations: Factor 1 – .41 .42 .37
Correlations: Factor 2 – .29 .27
Correlations: Factor 3 – .26
Note. Structure coefﬁcients are in parentheses. Coefﬁcients in bold load on factor (> .32, see [33]). Coefﬁcients smaller than .25 are not displayed.
h2 = communality coefﬁcient.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130100.t001
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proportion of variance in the items explained by a single factor solution at both personal and
collective level. For personal-level judgments, results showed that on average 23% of the vari-
ance in the items was accounted for by single-factor Z. For collective-level items, on average
54% of the variance was accounted for by Z. Hence, collective-level estimates bear evidence of a
strong latent factor Z, whereas at the personal level, there is only weak evidence of such a latent
factor.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed that as predicted, participants estimated the prevalence of socie-
tal problems in the life of the average Dutch person to be higher than in their personal lives.
Moreover, in contrast to personal-level estimates, collective-level estimates clustered together
in one factor in EFA. This single latent factor in turn accounted for a higher amount of variance
in the variables. Together, these results are consistent with our prediction that Zeitgeist as rep-
resented by a latent factor Z underlies specific collective-level judgments about society.
A measure based on prevalence estimates of societal problems has specific advantages: its
unit of measurement (days) has the same meaning across dimensions, which enhances compa-
rability across measures (see e.g. [13]). Additionally, this measure focuses on relatively concrete
problems that people encounter both in their daily life and in the abstract (e.g., crime as a con-
crete experience vs. as a social construct). However, a limitation of this methodology is that it
ignores a second class of societal discontents: abstract notions that cannot be expressed in abso-
lute numbers, such as “trust in government”. In Study 2, we therefore tested an alternative
method to measure this second aspect of Z, which captures these abstract societal discontents.
Study 2
In Study 2 we investigated abstract-level judgments about ideas, values and institutions in soci-
ety. Such discontents may crop up in public debate as blanket assertions about society: “we”
have lost trust in the government, society has problems with immigrants or solidarity among
citizens is declining. Again, we suggest that at the collective level, these abstract judgments are
influenced by one underlying evaluation of the state of society: a Zeitgeist. In contrast, personal
and more concrete judgments should be predicted more strongly by personal experiences,
which may cluster together in various factors reflecting various domains of life. In order to
assess these predictions, we developed a measure of collective perceptions of society that asks
participants to judge the same issues on different dimensions: that is, on a personal and collec-
tive level, and with these same issues framed in more abstract and more concrete terms. For
theoretical reasons, we are most interested in examining the personal-level concrete judgments
and collective-level abstract judgments. Exploratively, we also included personal-abstract and
collective-concrete judgments. These additional analyses (which also examined the differences
in means between all dimensions and the influence of abstract vs. concrete wording in the
items) are presented in S1 Supplementary Materials.
Furthermore, Study 2 explores the predictive validity of Z. We expect that Zeitgeist would
affect people’s spontaneous interpretation of new events and new information about their soci-
ety: any new incidents and stories would have to be interpreted in such a way that they become
aligned with the current Zeitgeist. Thus, we predict that Z will influence this impromptu inter-
pretation. If the Zeitgeist is negative, pessimistic news headlines would be more likely to be per-
ceived as true than optimistic ones. Furthermore, when confronted with individual examples
of negative behavior, Z should predict whether these negative events are attributed to general
characteristics of society and human nature.
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Method
Participants and design. Participants were 255 members of a representative panel of the
Dutch population. They completed an online questionnaire distributed by a commercial
agency in return for a monetary reward (the equivalent of approx. $2,-). The sample consisted
of 146 men and 109 women, who ranged in age from 18 to 80 years old (M = 49.5,Med = 54).
Procedure and materials. Participants received a link to an online survey about life in the
Netherlands. The introduction page of the questionnaire provided participants with informa-
tion about the research purposes and an informed consent agreement. Before the main mea-
sures, several constructs were included for explorative reasons and to aid assessment of
convergent and discriminant validity in future studies. These constructs were (all measured on
7-point scales): Optimism (10 items; adapted from [32]); general social trust (3 items, adapted
from [37]); social trust in other groups (4 items, adapted from [38]); political trust (4 items;
adapted from [37]); neighbourhood safety (4 items, adapted from [37]); identification with the
Netherlands (4 items; [39]); and state of the country (2 items: “In general, would you expect life
for most people in the Netherlands to become better or worse?” and “To what extent is life for
most people in the Netherlands better or worse than in the year 2000?”). Correlations between
these variables and collective- and personal-level evaluative statements are presented in
Table B in S1 Supplementary Materials, for interested readers. The main measures were pre-
sented to participants in the same order as described below. After completion, participants
were given a brief explanation of the purpose of the study and were thanked for their
cooperation.
Personal and collective perceptions of (dis)content. Wemeasured participants’ judg-
ments of 14 societal topics on a personal (concrete) and a collective (abstract) judgment dimen-
sion. The societal topics were selected to reflect a broad range of issues considered important in
contemporary (Dutch) society, both for the functioning of society in general and as perceived
challenges to society today. The topic selection of topics generally important for society was
inspired by Haidt and colleagues’moral foundations theory, which reflects domains that are
important in collective (moral) life: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty,
Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity [40,41]. A further set of issues was derived from current
public debates on the state of Dutch society (e.g., trust in government, immigration). We
aimed to balance the valence of the evaluative statements, by including positively (+) as well as
negatively framed topics. Thus, the 14 societal topics included in our measure were: Violence,
Care (+), Honesty (+), Corruption, Injustice by others, Injustice by governmental agencies,
Inequality, Trust (+), Social Cohesion (+), Egotism, Immigration, Loyalty (+), Lack of respect,
and Lack of decency. Each topic was assessed with two items. For example, the resulting items
for the societal topic “egotism” were (translated into English): “In my personal life, my experi-
ence is that people act mostly out of self-interest” (personal-concrete) and “Egotism is a prob-
lem in society” (collective-abstract). The personal-concrete wording reflects concrete
experiences with selfishness that people might encounter in their day to day life. The collective-
abstract wording is of the form in which it enters the public debate.
All evaluative statements were measured on a scale from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly
agree, with 4 neither agree, nor disagree. Personal and collective items were measured in two
separate blocks. Within these blocks, all items were randomized. First, participants received
instructions to think about themselves and their personal lives: “think for example about the
conversations you have, the things you do, and the people and situations you encounter in
your daily life”. Participants subsequently indicated agreement with items at the personal level.
Next, participants received instructions to think about Dutch society and indicate agreement
with collective-level items: “think for example about topics Dutch people tend to talk about,
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the things that Dutch people do, and the situations and individuals that Dutch people encoun-
ter in society”. All items are reported in full in S1 Appendix.
Predictive validity: newspaper headlines and news reports. In order to explore whether
Z predicted participants’ impromptu interpretation of new information about society, partici-
pants were first asked to indicate the extent to which they thought 14 newspaper headlines
could be true. These headlines consisted of seven pairs, providing the opposite claim on the
same topic: for example, “Criminality in the Netherlands strongly increased in 2011” (a nega-
tive headline) and “Criminality in the Netherlands strongly decreased in 2011” (positive). Two
subscales were computed: negative headlines (α = .71) and positive headlines (α = .76). The
headlines were rated on a scale from 1 very untrue to 7 very true, with 4 neutral.
Participants then read three short news reports, “such as one could encounter daily in the
newspapers, on the internet, or on television”. These were inspired by news stories which had
made headlines in the regional or national media a few years ago, about a man who laid dead
in his house for two years before he was found by the police, about a man who had beaten a
dog to death, and about ambulance personnel who were attacked by bystanders. After reading
each report, participants indicated to what extent the cause of this event lay with (i) those
involved in the situation, (ii) current society, and (iii) humanity, on a scale from -3 not at all
true to 3 very true, with 0 neutral. Three subscales were computed across the three news reports
(three items each): situational attribution (low reliability, α = .27), societal attribution (α =
.56), and attribution to humankind (α = .72). Finally, demographic variables were assessed:
age, sex, nationality, education level, and employment status.
Results
Analytic strategy. During preliminary screening for outliers seven participants were
excluded. Five participants were excluded because they took less than 5 minutes to complete
the study, which on average took participants approximately 19 minutes (5% trimmed mean).
One participant was excluded for completing only the first part of the questionnaire (i.e. not
the main variables). Furthermore, one outlier was detected after screening for multivariate out-
liers by computing Mahalanobis distance [33]. All further analyses were thus conducted on
responses of N = 248 participants. First, EFAs examined the factor structure underlying per-
sonal(-concrete) and collective(-abstract) perceptions of society. Given that we did not have
predictions for the specific factor structure of personal-level judgments, we again chose to
examine factor structure using EFA. Second, regression analyses examined whether interpreta-
tion of news headlines and incidents could be predicted by Z. Analyses examining mean differ-
ences between personal and collective judgments are reported in S1 Supplementary Materials.
The mean differences were in line with the results of Study 1 and showed that participants
were more negative (and less positive) about collective life compared to their personal lives.
Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA). As in Study 1, Principal Axis Factoring with Promax
rotation was used. For personal-concrete judgments, three factors were extracted with eigenval-
ues of 5.56, 1.66, and 1.13 (see Table 2). The total amount of variance explained by this factor
structure was 59.63%. Communality coefficients tended to be quite low, with several values
below .40. The variables seemed not well-defined by this factor solution, with two variables not
loading on any factor (loadings< .32; other factor loadings ranged from .35 to .99). Thus, we
concluded that for personal-concrete judgments, the factor solution was suboptimal.
In contrast, for collective-abstract judgments, two factors were extracted with eigenvalues of
5.77 and 1.95, explaining 55.19% of the variance in the data (see Table 2). Item-valence seemed
to have influenced the factor structure to create a “method factor”: negative variables loaded on
one factor, positive variables on another. The factors were highly correlated with each other at-
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.54. Factor loadings were all excellent, ranging between .60 and .80, except for the item Immi-
gration (.42). This item stands out due to its relatively low communality coefficient (.19), sug-
gesting that it might not be a close fit to the factor. In all, we concluded that this two-factor
solution has good fit for collective-abstract judgments.
The fact that negatively and positively framed variables formed a method factor can be due
to characteristics (i.e., valence) on item-level, but could also indicate that judgments about pos-
itive characteristics of society are to some extent independent of judgments about negative
characteristics. For now, we will take this valence distinction into account in our further analy-
ses, and assess the amount of variance in the items that is accounted for by this two-factor
representation of Z.
Variance explained by Z. Again, we investigated the influence of Z on the judgments of
specific issues by calculating the amount of variance in the items that was accounted for by Z
(i.e., in this model Z-negative and Z-positive). Results show that on average, 42% of the variance
in negative collective judgments was accounted for by Z, compared to 36% for negative per-
sonal judgments. For positive collective judgments, on average 59% of the variance was
accounted for by Z, compared to 54% for positive personal judgments. Thus, in line with Study
1 these results suggest the strongest influence of a latent factor Z on collective(-abstract)
judgments.
Exploring predictive validity. Finally, we examined whether participants’ interpretation
of news headlines and news reports could be predicted by Zeitgeist, as represented by their
scores on the latent factor Z. For this we focused only on the negative items, because we were
specifically interested in the relation between discontent and negative news and events in this
Dutch context. Following the factor structure extracted from EFA, aggregated scores were
Table 2. EFA Pattern and Structure Coefficients of Personal-Concrete and Collective-Abstract Judgments (Promax; Study 2).
Personal-Concrete Collective-Abstract
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 h2 Factor 1 Factor 2 h2
Loyalty .88 (.81) (.41) (.31) .67 (.43) .78 (.78) .61
Care .75 (.70) (.32) (.32) .49 (.41) .72 (.73) .53
Trust .74 (.76) (.46) (.37) .58 (.48) .76 (.79) .63
Honesty .73 (.75) (.44) (.38) .56 (.45) .80 (.81) .65
Social cohesion .71 (.64) (.26) (.30) .42 (.33) .77 (.72) .53
Lack of respect .35 (.57) (.50) .29 (.54) .43 .71 (.72) (.41) .52
Injustice by others .29 (.54) (.53) (.51) .40 .62 (.70) (.48) .50
Inequality (.34) .99 (.84) (.38) .74 .64 (.63) (.32) .39
Corruption (.30) .61 (.61) (.40) .39 .60 (.64) (.40) .41
Egoism .29 (.49) .43 (.55) (.30) .36 .77 (.70) (.29) .50
Injustice by government .30 (.50) .35 (.53) (.37) .34 .60 (.63) (.38) .40
Violence (.29) (.41) .99 (.88) .78 .65 (.60) (.27) .37
Immigration (.44) (.44) .67 (.72) .53 .42 (.44) (.26) .19
Lack of decency (.42) .31 (.54) .31 (.53) .37 .71 (.73) (.42) .53
Eigenvalue 5.56 1.66 1.13 5.77 1.95
Percentage of variance 39.73 11.85 8.06 41.24 13.95
Correlations: Factor 1 – -.56 -.49 – -.54
Correlations: Factor 2 – .56
Note. Structure coefﬁcients are in parentheses. Coefﬁcients in bold load on factor (> .32, see [33]). Coefﬁcients smaller than .25 are not displayed.
h2 = communality coefﬁcient.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130100.t002
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computed for two negative personal judgment factors (Factor 1: Injustice by others, Inequality,
Corruption, Egoism, Injustice by Government (α = .72) and Factor 2: Violence, Immigration
(α = .77)) and one collective judgment factor (Factor 1: Injustice by others, Inequality, Lack of
respect, Corruption, Egoism, Injustice by government, Violence, Immigration, and Lack of
decency (α = .86)). Regression analyses were used to determine the influence of personal and
collective judgments on the interpretation of news headlines and attributions. We expected the
collective level to be the best predictor in line with hypotheses concerning Z. Table 3 presents
the results.
We first examined the influence of the judgment dimensions on negative news headlines.
Only collective judgments were a significant predictor, β = .64, t(244) = 11.10, p< .001, while
personal judgments did not predict participants’ interpretation of negative news headlines. So,
people with higher collective-level reports of societal problems were more likely to interpret nega-
tive news headlines as truthful, while personal-level perceptions of problems were unrelated. Col-
lective judgments explained 41% of the variance in scores on negative news headlines (F(3, 244)
= 56.17, p< .001). Similar results were found for positive news headlines, although there was less
variance explained (R2 = .23, F(3, 244) = 24.53, p< .001). Again, collective judgments signifi-
cantly (and negatively) predicted participants’ interpretation of positive news headlines, β = -.54,
t(244) = -8.21, p< .001. The second personal-level judgment factor was a significant (positive)
predictor as well, β = .14, t(244) = 2.28, p = .02, but had a quite small unique contribution to the
explained variance compared to collective-level judgments (sr2 = .02 vs. sr2 = .21 respectively).
The influence of Z on the attribution of causality in news reports was examined using the
same approach (see Table 3). The items for attribution of causality to the persons involved in
the news reports combined to an unreliable scale (α = .27), and will therefore be left out of sub-
sequent analyses. With respect to societal attributions, only collective judgments were a signifi-
cant predictor, β = .44, t(244) = 6.41, p< .001, (R2 = .17, F(3, 244) = 16.12, p< .001). Thus,
higher reports of societal problems predicted people’s attribution of causality in these sensa-
tional news reports to society. The results for attributions to humankind were again broadly
similar (see Table 3). Only collective judgments significantly predicted attributions to human-
kind (β = .31, t(231) = 4.27, p< .001 and R2 = .14, F(3, 231) = 11.98, p< .001). In sum, these
results suggest that collective(-abstract) judgments representing Z are the best predictors of
interpretations and attributions of new information about society.
Table 3. Regression Analysis for Predictors of Negative and Positive Headlines and Attribution of Causality to Society and Humanity in Reports
(Study 2).
Negative headlines Positive headlines Reports–Society Reports–Humanity
B (SE) β B (SE) β B (SE) β B (SE) β
Constant 2.47 (.20)*** 4.78 (.25) *** 2.68 (.37)** 1.86 (.47) ***
Personal 1 -.02 (.04) -.03 .05 (.05) .08 -.07 (.07) -.07 .04 (.09) .03
Personal 2 .02 (.03) .05 .08 (.04) .14* .00 (.05) .00 .09 (.07) .10
Collective .55 (.05) .64*** -.50 (.06) -.54*** .58 (.09) .44*** .49 (.12) .31***
R2 .41*** .23*** .17*** .14***
Note. Personal 1 = mean personal-concrete judgments of Injustice by others, Inequality, Corruption, Egoism, Injustice by Government; Personal 2 = mean
personal-concrete judgments of Violence, Immigration; Collective = mean collective-abstract judgments of Injustice by others, Inequality, Lack of respect,
Corruption, Egoism, Injustice by government, Violence, Immigration, Lack of decency.
* p  .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130100.t003
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Discussion
The results of Study 2 replicated the patterns we found in Study 1. These results provide further
evidence for a general factor Z, reflecting Zeitgeist in collective-abstract judgments about soci-
ety. EFA showed that for collective-abstract judgments, a well-fitting two-factor structure
could be defined; this reflected not only our hypothesized general factor Z, but also a “method
factor” constructed through the influence of item valence (positive vs. negative). In contrast,
EFA did not reveal a well-fitting factor solution for personal-concrete judgments. Furthermore,
a two-factor representation of Z (a positive and a negative factor) accounted for most variance
in collective-abstract items, compared to personal-concrete items. Further evidence for the
conceptualization of Zeitgeist is provided through the exploration of its predictive validity. We
found that participants’ judgments of collective-abstract issues, representing Z, were the stron-
gest or only predictor of their impromptu interpretation and attribution of new information
about society. While the measures we used in Study 1 and 2 have important differences, both
seem to be able to reflect the gloom about society that is felt in the Netherlands. In order to
gain understanding of the relation between these measures, we directly compared them by
including both in Study 3.
Study 3
Study 3 has two main aims: first, it explores the relation between the prevalence estimates of
concrete societal problems and the (more conventional) judgments of societal issues applied to
(concrete) personal life versus (abstract) collective life. By combining both measures in one
study, we aim to learn more about how these judgments of societal issues are connected to each
other and we can directly compare their utility.
Second, Study 3 transfers these methods of measuring perceptions of society from the con-
text of Dutch society to American society. By changing the societal context of our research, we
hope to explore the generalizability of our conceptualization of Zeitgeist and our newly
designed methods for measuring it. Since in the US the general perception of the state of society
also seemed to be gloomy (e.g. [3]), we believed this to be an interesting comparison country
for the results we obtained in the Netherlands.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 287 (167 female, 120 male) members of the
American general public, who ranged in age from 18 to 82 years old (M = 34.7,Med = 31,
SD = 12.5). The sample was predominantly White (81.9%), with a minority of African Ameri-
cans (5.6%), Hispanics (5.9%), and Asians (4.9%). The data was collected shortly before the US
2012 presidential election; 56.1% (161) of participants intended to vote for Obama/Biden
(Democratic Party), 27.2% (78) for Romney/Ryan (Republican Party), and 16.7% (48) partici-
pants either intended to vote for a third party candidate, were undecided, or indicated not to
care about the elections.
Procedure and materials. Participants were invited through Amazon MTurk to complete
an online questionnaire. They received $0.50 for participation. The study started with informa-
tion about the research purposes and an informed consent agreement. The questionnaire gen-
erally replicated the design of Study 2; the constructs were measured in order as described
below. As in Study 2, we included the variables that may help to inform us about convergent
and divergent validity in later research: optimism [32], neighbourhood safety (4 items, adapted
from [37]), general social trust [37], social trust in other groups [38], and political trust [37].
Correlations between these variables and collective- and personal-level judgments are
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presented in Table C in S1 Supplementary Materials, for interested readers. After completion,
participants were given a brief description of the study and thanked.
Collective perceptions of society. Collective perceptions of society were assessed by com-
bining the methods of Study 1 and 2: prevalence estimates of specific societal problems and
(dis)agreement with evaluative statements about general societal topics. Both measures are
reported in full in S1 Appendix.
Prevalence estimates: Prevalence of 18 societal problems was judged in one’s own life (per-
sonal level) and for the average American (collective level), using the method described in
Study 1. The problems that were included were partly based on Study 1 but adjusted to include
societal issues that were discussed in the period prior to the US presidential election: Crime,
Personal safety, Loitering teens, Immigration, Health care provision, Global warming, The
economy, The recession, Money shortage, Unemployment, The government, The police, Cor-
ruption or fraud, Discrimination, Obesity, Alcohol or drugs abuse, Offensive behavior by
strangers, and Offensive behavior by friends/acquaintances.
Evaluative statements: Participants were asked to judge statements about 12 general societal
topics. Based on Study 2, we included the following topics: Violence, Care (+), Honesty (+),
Corruption, Injustice, Inequality, Trust (+), Social cohesion (+), Egoism, Loyalty (+), Lack of
respect, and Lack of decency. Each topic was measured on a personal-concrete and a collective-
abstract judgment-dimension. We also exploratively included personal-abstract and collective-
concrete judgments. These results are generally in line with those of Study 2 and not reported
here. The topics were measured on a scale from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree, with 4
neither agree, nor disagree.
Items at the personal and collective level were measured in two separate blocks, which were
counterbalanced. At the personal level, participants first received instructions to think about
their personal day-to-day experiences: “Think for example about the conversations that you
have, the things that you do, and the people and situations you encounter in your daily life”.
Participants then were asked to indicate their (dis)agreement with the personal-concrete evalu-
ative statements. After this, participants completed the prevalence estimates at personal level.
At the collective level, participants were instructed to think about experiences in present-
day society: “Think about the issues that other Americans talk about, the things that other
Americans do and the people and situations that other Americans encounter in society”. Subse-
quently, participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with the collective-abstract eval-
uative statements, and after this, they completed the prevalence estimates at collective level.
Predictive validity: newspaper headlines. Wemeasured participants’ interpretation of
newspaper headlines to explore the predictive validity of Z. This measure was based on the
measure we used in Study 2, but adapted to the American context and altered in the sense that
we used 10 positive and negative single statements (as opposed to paired statements in Study
2). Participants indicated the extent to which they thought these headlines could be true on a
scale from 1 = completely untrue to 7 = completely true, with 4 = neither true, nor untrue. Exam-
ples of the headlines were: “U.S. crime rates increase in 2012” and “Increasing number of
Americans in debt”. The full scale (six items reflecting negative developments in society and
four items reflecting positive developments in society) had low reliability and inspection of
means, standard deviations, and correlations suggested that several items were understood dif-
ferently then we intended. We therefore decided to leave aside one negative item (designed to
resemble a form of symbolic threat, “Fewer Americans celebrate Thanksgiving”) and the four
positive items (e.g., “Trust in government is growing”) and instead use five negative items to
form a negative headlines scale (α = .61). Finally, demographic variables were assessed: age, sex,
ethnicity, level of education, voting intentions, and political views.
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Results
On the basis of preliminary screening for outliers with Mahalanobis distance (see e.g. [33]) 12
participants with incoherent response patterns on key variables (e.g., consistently answering 7
on both normal and reversed items) were excluded. All further analyses were conducted on
N = 275 participants. The analytic strategy followed that of Studies 1 and 2. However, for ana-
lyzing the results of Study 3 we used CFA to test the one factor Zmodel and the amount of var-
iance explained by Z in collective-level (vs. personal-level) judgments.
Inspection of differences in means. We conducted one-way repeated measures ANOVA’s
separately for the prevalence estimates and the negatively- and positively-framed evaluative
statements. Results of Study 1 and 2 were globally replicated. For the prevalence estimates, par-
ticipants estimated to have personally encountered societal problems on 5.28 [4.72, 5.83] out of
the last 30 days (a score much higher than that in Study 1, also on individual items concerning
crime, a.o.). However, the average American was estimated to have encountered the same
problems about twice as much: 10.45 [9.67, 11.24] out of the last 30 days, F(1,273) = 228.33, p
< .001, ηp
2 = .46.
For negatively-framed evaluative statements, participants disagreed that negative topics
affected their personal life, (M = 3.20 [3.08; 3.32]), but on average agreed that these topics
affected collective life, (M = 4.49 [4.37, 4.60]), F(1,274) = 384.15, p< .001, ηp
2 = .58. For posi-
tively-framed statements, participants agreed that these topics affected their personal life
(M = 5.12 [5.00, 5.24]) more than they affected the life of Americans in general (M = 4.20
[4.09, 4.31]), F(1,274) = 263.86, p< .001, ηp
2 = .49. Thus as expected, participants were more
negative and less positive about societal issues in collective life than in their personal lives, both
when responding to statements and when estimating concrete numbers.
Relations between dimensions. The correlations between factors in all studies (1–3) are
reported in full in Table D in S1 Supplementary Materials. Here we focus only on the correla-
tion between the different Z estimates based on prevalence estimates and evaluative statements.
This correlation was moderate to strong (r = .41), suggesting that there was (limited) overlap.
The difference between these two estimates could either be due to them tapping into different
kinds of judgments or information about what society is, but it is also likely that the different
measurement scales reduced the overlap.
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA): assessing variance explained by Z. We used a
structural equation modelling technique (CFA) to test the Z-model and the amount of variance
explained by Z in the prevalence estimates and collective(-abstract) and personal(-concrete)
statement-judgments. The variance R2 accounted for by Z indicates the extent to which a gen-
eral factor influences perceptions of particular societal problems, and is our main outcome var-
iable. We predicted that this R2 would be higher for collective- than for personal-level
judgments. Estimates of model fit also indicate to what extent a single dimension could be
identified. Thus, we inspected the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR; value< .08
indicates reasonable fit; [42]), the comparative fit index (CFI; value> .90 indicates reasonable
fit; [43]), and the root-mean-square-error-of-approximation (RMSEA; value< .08 indicates
reasonable fit; [44]). The analyses were conducted with R 3.0.2 and the Lavaan package [45].
Prevalence estimates. For the prevalence estimates, we tested a model with one latent fac-
tor Z predicting the prevalence of Crime, Loitering teens, Immigrants, Health care provision,
Global warming, The recession, The government, The police, Corruption, Discrimination,
Obesity, and Offensive behavior by strangers, on the personal versus collective level (note that
the variables Personal safety, The economy, Money shortages, Unemployment, and Offensive
behavior by friends were dropped from the analyses because preliminary analyses suggested
item redundancies: personal safety was correlated .78 with crime; the economy, money
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shortages, and unemployment were correlated .89, .77 and .55 with the recession respectively;
and offensive behavior by friends was correlated .78 with offensive behavior by strangers.) Two
modification indices in preliminary analyses indicated above-average covariances. The models
took this into account by including the covariance between the error terms of the variables
Recession and The government, The police and Obesity in the model. Finally, the analyses of
univariate skewness and kurtosis suggested possible violations of the assumption of multivari-
ate normality. We therefore conducted analyses using maximum likelihood estimation with
robust standard errors and a Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistic [35,46].
The fit indices indicated a good fit of the Z-model for collective-level estimates (CFI = .95;
SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.05; .08]), and poor to acceptable fit for personal-level esti-
mates (CFI = .88; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.03; .06]). The amount of variance in the
variables accounted for by Z was assessed by inspecting the R2-values for all variables and cal-
culating R2-means (R2-means were calculated by calculating the mean of Fisher Z transformed
R-values, which were subsequently back-transformed and squared). As predicted, the mean
R2-value for the collective prevalence estimates was higher (R2-mean = .45) than for personal
prevalence estimates (R2-mean = .29). Thus, results confirm that the one factor Z-model
explained the largest amount of variance at the collective level.
Evaluative statements. Preliminary analyses of the statement-judgments indicated that
positive and negative variables loaded onto separate factors, similar to Study 2. Accordingly we
specified a bifactor model in CFA which modelled a positive and negative factor and (concur-
rently) the general factor Z. In such a bifactor model, all factors are independent (as opposed to
a hierarchical model, is which the positive and negative factor would be correlated with the
general factor) and this means that method variance can be partialled out. Moreover, in a bifac-
tor approach the strength of the general factor (relative to the positive and negative factors) can
be assessed (e.g., [47]).
First, model fit was briefly inspected. The fit indices suggested good fit of the bifactor model
for personal judgments (CFI = .96; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.05; .09]) as well as for
collective judgments (CFI = .94; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .08, 90% CI [.06; .10]). Next, we
inspected R2-values for all items and calculated R2-means accounted for by the models. Similar
to results of Studies 1 and 2, somewhat less variance was accounted for by the model of per-
sonal judgments (R2-mean = .45), than by the model of collective judgments (R2 = .53). Within
this overall variance explained, the positive and negative factors explained less variance (rang-
ing from 19% to 21%) compared with the general factor: 59% for collective and 59% for per-
sonal, respectively. Putting things together, the results are consistent with those of Study 2:
although there are differences between personally- and negatively worded items, there is also
evidence for a general factor Z at the collective level in particular. But, it should be noted that
compared with Study 2, the differences between the personal and collective level are smaller.
The implications of this are considered in the discussion.
Predictive validity: the interpretation of news headlines. In a final set of analyses, we
tested whether Z could predict the interpretation of negative news headlines. Similar to Study
2, we conducted a regression analysis with predictor Z represented by the average scores on the
collective judgment dimensions. Hence, two scales were constructed by averaging scores on the
prevalence estimates (as were used in CFA) on personal and collective level (P30: α = .78 and
C30: α = .90). Furthermore, the two scales were constructed by averaging participants’ scores
on the variables Violence, Egotism, Lack of decency, Injustice, Lack of respect and Corruption
for personal-concrete and collective-abstract judgments (PC: α = .76 and CA: α = .81). We
expected CA and C30 to be the best predictors in the model, both contributing to the interpreta-
tion of news headlines. The results are presented in Table 4.
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Both collective-level judgment dimensions were significant predictors of people’s interpre-
tation of negative news headlines, CA: β = .31, t(269) = 4.89, p< .001 and C30: β = .26, t(269) =
3.88, p< .001, while personal-level judgments were not. Thus, higher collective-level reports of
problems in society again predicted higher likelihood of interpreting news headlines as truth-
ful. The model significantly explained 19% of the variance in participants’ interpretation of
news headlines (F(4, 269) = 15.28, p< .001). In line with the results of Study 2, this suggest
that Z as represented by these collective constructs has predictive validity.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 show that similar to what we found in Dutch society, our American par-
ticipants were more negative and less positive about collective life than about their personal
lives. In all, we again found evidence for our hypothesized conceptualization of Zeitgeist: for
both types of collective-level judgments stronger evidence was found for a latent factor Z than
for both types of personal-level judgments. Moreover, both collective-level measures predicted
participants’ interpretation of news headlines.
One potential limitation of this study is the societal context at the time the data were col-
lected: the US 2012 presidential elections. The salience of societal issues in discussion between
politicians and in mass media during election time might have influenced people’s collective-
level judgments of societal issues in our measures, potentially inflating the discrepancy between
personal- and collective-level judgments that we found. However, given that discrepancy is
very large and in line with the results of Study 1 and 2 we suspect that the interpretation of
these findings, that participants were more negative about collective life than about their per-
sonal lives, remains valid.
Second, important to note is that this study showed that CFA procedures are extremely sen-
sitive to item-overlap in the covariance matrix, that is to pairs or groups of items which corre-
lated much higher with each other than with the other items. For example, high correlations
between pairs of items in the prevalence-estimates measure (crime and personal safety, for
example) prevented our initial CFAs from fitting acceptably and necessitated modifications to
the CFA models (effectively reducing the influence of item redundancy). The sensitivity of
these analyses to redundancy within the data demands careful item selection in future research.
Furthermore, while the results showed most evidence for a latent factor Z in collective-level
statement judgments, the difference with personal-level judgments was relatively small. This
difference was more pronounced between personal- and collective-level prevalence estimates:
Table 4. Regression Analysis for Predictors of Negative News Headlines (Study 3).
B (SE) β
Constant 3.85 (.22)***
PC -0.03 (.05) -.04
P30 -0.02 (.01) -.11
CA 0.27 (.06) .31***
C30 0.03 (.01) .26***
R2 .19***
Note. PC = personal-concrete judgments; P30 = personal prevalence estimates; CA = collective-abstract;
C30 = collective prevalence estimates.
* p  .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130100.t004
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the Z-model had a good fit for collective estimates and accounted for a higher amount of the
variance in the items, suggesting a greater influence of Z on people’s estimates of collective
problems. Given the pattern of results that Study 3 provides, we recommend using the preva-
lence estimates method for measuring Zeitgeist in future research.
General Discussion
In the present research we aimed to develop a new method of measuring Zeitgeist in order to
better understand the current state of societal discontent in many Western countries. The
results are consistent with the assumption that Zeitgeist is a collective global-level evaluation of
the state (and future) of society that affects particular collective judgments concerning society.
Across all three studies, we demonstrated that aggregated perceptions at the personal and col-
lective level were very different (Study 1–3). Moreover, our theoretical model was supported by
the present research: We consistently found evidence for a latent factor Z, underlying collec-
tive-level perceptions of the state of society (Study 1–3). In addition, the results showed that
this Z predicted how new information about society is interpreted and attributed (Study 2 and
3).
The results confirm the apparent societal discontent that seems to characterize the Zeitgeist
in both the Netherlands and the US: Our research showed a large significant difference between
personal and collective perceptions of the same societal issues. On the more concrete preva-
lence estimates, Dutch and Americans alike believed that “the average person” in their country
encountered societal problems many more times in the last 30 days than they did themselves.
Moreover, the evaluative statement-judgments showed that while participants on average dis-
agreed that societal issues pose a problem in their personal lives, they on average agreed that
the same issues were a problem in society. The magnitude of these differences is unrealistically
large, yet in line with what we anticipated to find about the Zeitgeist in those countries. Our
findings suggest that to the respondents in our samples, both types of perceptions are “real” in
the sense that these are the social realities they perceive in their personal life and in society in
general. But it would be hard to ignore that collective-level perceptions both in the Netherlands
and in the US are very different from realities that are grounded in concrete personal experi-
ence. While one might point out that personal-level perceptions are equally subjective and
unlikely to correspond to “the truth” (and indeed we know they are distorted by various cogni-
tive and motivational biases, see e.g. [5–7]), it is nevertheless important to note that personal-
level perceptions are much more in line with official records of problems such as crime levels.
These results are also consistent with the findings in the risk perception literature and cross-
national and cross-cultural literature that point to the utility of measuring collective-level
beliefs and values [18,19,21,23,24]. Even though such collective-level (or intersubjective) con-
structs do not necessarily bear any relation to their personal-level counterpart, they can
uniquely predict variance in important outcomes. This stresses the importance of investigating
and understanding collective-level perceptions.
Furthermore, the present research tested our hypothesized model of general factor Z under-
lying and predicting collective judgments about societal issues. The results indicated support
for our approach: For collective-level judgments, we found one general latent factor Z (note
that in the evaluative statement-measure in Study 2 and 3 a “method” factor reflected semantic
differences between positively and negatively framed items). Noteworthy is that this latent Z
factor predicts collective-level judgements across a broad range of topics, both currently impor-
tant (e.g., the recession) and generally important in society (covering different moral founda-
tions such as care, lack of respect, etc. [40,41]). In contrast, for personal-level judgments
multiple factors were found, reflecting clusters of topics in various areas of life (e.g., safety,
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social bonds, economy, etc.). In addition, general factor Z explained the highest amount of vari-
ance in collective-level items in comparison to personal-level items, suggesting the strongest
influence of Z on the various collective perceptions of society.
One unanticipated finding was the so-called “method factor” that appeared in the EFA for
evaluative statements in Study 2 (and the preliminary analyses of Study 3). The valence of the
items in these studies (positive vs. negative) created a second factor, because positive items
were correlated slightly stronger with each other than with negative items and vice versa. Nev-
ertheless, positive and negative items are also correlated strongly with each other and thus are
anchored in a single dimension (see S1 Supplementary Materials), and most variance in the
bifactor model in Study 3 was explained by general factor Z, as compared to either the positive
or the negative factors. This suggests that the differences between positively- and negatively
worded items are due mainly to the semantic differences between them. Nevertheless, it is also
clear that positive and negative perceptions of societal issues are more independent than we ini-
tially assumed. A combination of focus group and survey based research shows that while peo-
ple are mostly negative and easily identify problems in society, when pressed to think about
things in society they can be proud of, they are able to come up with examples of topics that
actually have considerable overlap with the identified problems (e.g. the way people live
together in society, [1]). This indicates a possibly more complex relation between positive and
negative perceptions of society, which could be an interesting topic for future research. But in
view of the substantial and predicted correlation between the positive and negative judgments
and the explained variance in the bifactor model in Study 3, our conclusion nevertheless is that
the present results provide strong evidence for a general latent factor Z, underlying collective-
level perceptions of society.
Importantly, Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that Z can predict participants’ interpretation of
new information about society. When collective perceptions were combined into a scale repre-
senting Z, this Z predicted participants’ interpretation of news headlines (Study 2 and 3) and
the attribution of cause to society and humanity (Study 2). Not only do these results suggest
that Z has predictive validity, they are also a first step towards investigating the possible influ-
ence of Zeitgeist on individual-level outcomes. At least, these results clearly indicate that collec-
tive perceptions are good predictors of individual responses to social information–better than
personal perceptions in fact.
Summarizing these results, we suggest that this explorative research points to a new opera-
tionalization of societal discontents, conceived as Zeitgeist. Because the current climate of soci-
etal discontents was the starting point for this research, we have been focusing mostly on
people’s negative views of what society is and on the problems they see in their country. How-
ever, theoretically we assume that Zeitgeist can be (overly) positive as well as (overly) negative,
or somewhere in between. For example, until recently Australian citizens appear to have been
quite optimistic about their country: In 2009, 49% of Australians were optimistic about the
future (12% were pessimistic), and 48% reported to trust the federal government to “do the
right thing for Australian people”[4]. Only recently this strongly changed: between 2010 and
2014, pessimism about the future has risen to 19% (optimism fell to 43%) and trust in govern-
ment sharply declined to 26–31% [4]. While these statistics are hardly conclusive, they do
point towards the possibility of (unrealistically high) optimism, in contrast to the unrealistically
deep pessimism that we have seen some evidence of in the present research.
This assumption of relative independence between personal experiences and collective per-
ceptions has important theoretical consequences. If personal experiences are (at least at certain
historical junctures, and in relation to particular kinds of judgments) only tenuously relevant
to collective perceptions, then how do these collective perceptions develop and change? Thus
far, we can only make some educated guesses. First, people’s perceptions of society need to be
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shared for them to develop into collective evaluations, or ultimately Zeitgeist. Previous research
has examined how collective perceptions such as stereotypes are influenced by consensualiza-
tion in group interaction (e.g., [48–52]). Based on this research, we propose that the perceived
consensus within society or some of its strata strongly affects the content and development of
Zeitgeist. If perceived consensus is high, the Zeitgeist should be more pronounced, relatively
stable and independent of personal perceptions. In the absence of perceived consensus about
what “we” as society are, the Zeitgeist should be less pronounced, relatively unstable, and more
open to the projection of personal perceptions.
Of course, it is often suggested that these shared perceptions are also strongly influenced by
the media. But this mass communication effect is not as independent of consensualization
effects as it may first appear: in many cases the influence of mass communication is filtered
through personal communication [53–55]. Thus, people’s personal networks are likely to play
a key role in shaping Zeitgeist, alongside mass media. The present data complicate this image
somewhat further: respondents’ interpretation of news stories was strongly biased by their
beliefs about society. Apparently, Zeitgeist also shapes our interpretations of news stories.
Finally, we suggest that in order to understand the factors shaping collective perceptions of
the state of society, we need to devote some attention to people’s hopes and fears for their
society’s (near) future. For example, a historical study of the Dutch Golden Age [56] suggests
that periodic bouts of collective discontent during that time of great prosperity were fuelled by
anticipated societal decline (i.e., a popular consensus, established and maintained in pamphlets,
sermons and discourse, that sustained riches will eventually incur the wrath of God). In mod-
ern-day society, this implies that anticipation of societal change could predict the relative opti-
mism or pessimism of Zeitgeist: concerns that current standards might not be sustainable or
are under threat in the near future could lead to a more pessimistic Zeitgeist, that is the percep-
tion that society is in trouble today. In contrast, expectations of rising standards could lead to a
more optimistic Zeitgeist. Both ideas, the perceived consensus and the perceived future state of
society, open up interesting pathways for future research.
Implications
Zooming in on the practical implications of this research, we believe that this work has rele-
vance for public opinion research as well as for policy makers. Firstly, this research suggests
that although the aggregation of people’s personal perceptions of societal issues provides infor-
mation that is valuable and important in its own right, these statistics provide only part of the
picture. Collective-level information is crucial to understanding interesting and complex socie-
tal phenomena. We provide some evidence for this in the domain of the discrepancy between
personal well-being and collective discontent. This discrepancy currently can be observed in
several countries around the world. But we see no reason why this measurement logic can not
equally be applied to other phenomena (including those underlying collective euphoria prior
to economic bubbles, the measurement of cultural difference, etc.). The reason for the impor-
tance of this approach is that while the content of the Zeitgeist might turn out to be not very
“realistic”, the consequences of collective gloom about society are likely to be very real.
The present research showed that collective judgments of society (representing Zeitgeist)
affect the interpretation of new information about society. If we extrapolate from this, we can
be pretty sure that these perceptions shape and possibly distort “news” content, creating the
specter of a social reality devoid of any resonance with real life. Ironically, this pessimistic Zeit-
geist then would strongly affect politicians and policy makers to tackle societal problems which
on closer inspection might exist mainly as figments of public imagination. Anyone (politician,
policy maker, scientist or journalist) who advocates that policy should be based on crime
Collective Discontents and Zeitgeist
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0130100 June 26, 2015 22 / 26
statistics and hard evidence, is likely to encounter the charge of being out of touch with the
“reality” of crime and safety perceptions. Our social psychological approach could help to
understand and disentangle such societal pressures. If for example people demand more crime
fighting because they feel unsafe, while actual crime rates have been consistently dropping over
the years (as is the case in the Netherlands and was the case in the USA during the 1990s), we
suggest the “problem” to exist mainly as a collective perception of society being unsafe; to be
effective, solutions should then address these collective perceptions, not (only) personal experi-
ences. And in debates surrounding these issues, it may help to steer discussions away from the
general collective level, and towards the concrete personal level: after all, the same people who
believe that collective problems abound are likely to be quite content in their personal life, in
their neighborhood, at work, etc. It is at this concrete local level that perceptions and policy
choices may best coincide.
To conclude, this research is an important first step towards the development of a social
psychological approach of Zeitgeist, as a collective global-level affective evaluation of the state
of society. We found evidence in our studies for a large discrepancy between personal and col-
lective perceptions of the same societal issues, confirming gloominess about the state of society
that appears to exist in the Netherlands and the US. Furthermore, we have developed two new
methods of measuring Zeitgeist as general factor Z, which underlies and colors collective judg-
ments of specific societal issues. Finally, we demonstrated that Z can predict people’s interpre-
tation of new information about society. While the present work cannot answer all important
questions that it raises, we believe it to be of great value to both researchers and policy makers
as it helps to disentangle this puzzling societal discontent and keeping two levels of discontent
(personal and collective) separate. The present work may be considered a first contribution to
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